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__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The cars come crawling towards the District. The backup from the West on Route 66 
inside the beltway (7 miles to GZ) contains the usual mix of single commuters and ‘slugs’ 
looking to settle in to another day of work in the city. From the South comes the line of 
cars slowly making its way past the Occoquan (20 miles to GZ), transitioning from the 
outer suburbs into Fairfax County. Interstate 95 is full of cars and trucks headed south 
from Baltimore towards DC, and as it meets the Beltway (12 miles from GZ), cars can 
either head East or West around the road that rings the city. There is no quick and easy 
way into the city during rush hour. 
On this beautiful, crisp, clear winter morning, life around the city is shaping up much like 
any other day in the Nation’s Capital. Kids are off to school. Congressional hearings are 
an hour or so from starting. Offices are coming to life, and talk inevitably, turns back to 
the successes and failures of the Redskins. 
First comes the intensely bright flash. It is brighter than the flash of a million flashbulbs 
all going off at the very same time. Many of those on the highways headed into town are 
blinded, their retinas seared by the intense light. Cars driving at speed plow into others 
that are already slowing because of the start again -- stop again rush hour traffic. The 
highways are instantly made impassable, with hundreds of mangled cars littering the 
roadways.  Where the flash is not seen, close in to the city, there is an eerie howl, 
followed immediately by breaking glass and flying debris. Closer to ground zero, there is 
utter devastation. Buildings are collapsed in the immediate vicinity of the explosion. 
Many of those that are standing are on fire. An ill-defined plume of smoke, ash and dust 
begins to rise over the city. 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is no more. 
  
There have been a number of significant planning efforts focused on response to and recovery from the 
terrorist use of an improvised nuclear device (IND). The White House Office of Science Technology Policy 
led the creation of a first and second national planning guidance for IND response [1,2]. The National 
Labs contributed key inputs related to important mitigation steps that could save thousands of lives – a 
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message so simple it may be easy to deliver but hard to convince [3]. HHS/ASPR brought together 
subject matter experts to help describe many of the key health and medical response elements that will 
need to be implemented [4], illustrated the basic approach to the spontaneous formation of triage and 
treatment areas [5], and has continued to promote the development of crisis standards of care as part 
of a systems approach to catastrophic disaster response [6,7]. The intent of this paper is to highlight the 
role that healthcare coalitions will play in an event of this magnitude. “A primary purpose for any 
healthcare coalition is to promote optimal situational awareness for its member organizations through 
the collection, aggregation, and dissemination of incident information [8].” 
 
This paper will explore a number of issues related to catastrophic disaster event planning and response. 
The IND detonation scenario represents one of the most compelling examples of a sudden onset, no 
notice catastrophic event. The public health and healthcare issues and challenges that are forced upon 
the “collar communities”, those areas that are located outside of the blast zone but are  geographically 
adjacent to the affected region, will require close coordination and prioritization of available resources 
within the emergency response system. The decade long history of coalition development in the 
National Capital Region (NCR), with different efforts and approaches in each of the 3 jurisdictions, 
Maryland, DC and Northern Virginia will be reviewed. Description of the optimal framework for 
coordinating response between existing healthcare coalitions and emergency management 
infrastructure, including emergency operations centers and community reception centers, will be 
detailed. Finally, the paper will explore how coalitions that organize to form regional networks can 
improve communications of resource needs and provide situational awareness. The goal of such 
networks will be to enhance the response regarding management of the unstructured intake of arriving 
patients as well as providing for the intensive medical support irradiated patients will need under such 
circumstances. How can the “collar community” outlying healthcare coalitions coordinate with each 
other across jurisdictional lines in order to relieve the sudden surge in demand for care while helping 
those communities most severely impacted by the attack to begin the important process of recovery? 
 
Creating the Coalition Model – Developing Coalitions in DC, Maryland and Virginia 
In the immediate aftermath of the 9-11 and anthrax attacks, the need for better coordination and 
cooperation amongst hospitals, EMS agencies and public health departments across the Washington, DC 
metro region was quickly recognized. Prior to the 2001 attacks, planning efforts related to disaster 
preparedness and response within the three distinct jurisdictions was occurring at a varied pace. In the 
few years preceding that fateful fall, planning efforts focused on regional response were promoted in 
part by some of the initial Nunn-Luger-Domenici WMD grant funding. These efforts were encouraged by 
strong personalities and leaders whose vision for improved processes and procedures for hospital 
disaster response were being slowly heeded. Front and foremost were the efforts of the DC Hospital 
Association (DCHA) which was responsible for developing and implementing a city wide hospital mutual 
aid radio system (HMARS), developed what became the prototypical hospital mutual aid agreement that 
linked DC hospitals as response partners in event of an overwhelming crisis [9] and commissioned one 
of the first municipal bioterrorism response plans in the Nation, completed in August 2001 [10]. 
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The events of 2001 changed everything. Hospitals across the region recognized the importance of 
planning for disaster. The anthrax attacks proved that large scale disaster could essentially present as a 
public health and healthcare delivery event, with significantly less response actions required of the 
traditional first response agencies. And from this, the notion of developing a “coalition” of response 
agencies was born. How would public health, healthcare institutions, and the traditional first responder 
agencies, police, fire and EMS, coordinate their efforts to enact a uniform and unified response to such 
events?  
In the immediate aftermath of the events of the fall of 2001, an effort to promote these interdisciplinary 
linkages in northern Virginia was initiated. The Northern Virginia Emergency Response Coalition (NVERC) 
was created in October 2001, driven by the need to unify response efforts amongst the many hospitals 
and public health agencies affected by the surge in demand for screening and care related to 
inhalational anthrax cases. In addition, there was great interest in and concern regarding the need for 
specific training and expertise required for the response to future disaster events. It was developed 
under the auspices of the existing regional EMS council. Efforts that took hold in northern Virginia were 
indeed modeled directly upon the very successful planning and coordination efforts spearheaded by the 
DCHA. Three foundational elements of the DC effort can be seen in hospital coalitions that have 
developed across the country in the ensuing 10 plus years since the Northern Virginia effort crafted its 
own approach to coordinating hospital planning and response for disaster events. DCHA involved each 
of the District hospitals in their effort, including participation of the Veterans Hospital (VAMC) and the 
flagship Army military treatment facility (Walter Reed Medical Center) with the private institutions and 
public hospital (DC General) located across the city.  They pursued the development of HMARS in the 
mid 1990s, a radio system that linked all of the DC hospitals in real time, and developed a protocol for 
daily testing and information exchange. And in the context of intense healthcare business competition, 
DCHA developed and implemented a Hospital Memorandum of Understanding that governed the 
exchange of resources in times of crisis – it went so far as to assign “buddy” hospitals across the city so 
that no single institution was left unpaired. This DC hospital MOU became the prototype for the MOU 
shared across the nation by the American Hospital Association. The coordination of planning efforts 
across private and public institutions, the development of an MOU, and the establishment of a linked 
radio system were some of the first efforts in the United States to coordinate hospitals in the context of 
disaster planning and response, and were the foundations for the efforts that followed in northern 
Virginia.   
Northern Virginia 
The Northern Virginia Hospital Alliance (NVHA) was formed in October 2002, an effort initiated by two 
of the three recognized leaders of the NVERC. Although the NVERC ‘coalition’ focus was deemed vitally 
important, and was very successful during its relatively brief duration, it became clear that specific 
needs of the northern Virginia hospitals regarding planning and response required a different approach 
than that required by their municipal public health, law enforcement, fire and EMS partners. NVHA is 
comprised of 14 member hospitals and 6 free-standing fully functional emergency departments in the 
northern Virginia suburbs of Washington DC. It includes facilities that serve a population of over 2.5 
million residents over 3,000 square miles – ranging from suburban to exurban to rural communities. The 
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hospitals have over 3,500 acute care beds, and provide more than 700,000 ED visits and over 170,000 
hospital admissions (2009 data). As a conglomerate, the NVHA member hospitals have over 40,000 
employees, making them the largest private sector employer in northern Virginia [11]. 
The organization was conceived as both a planning and response entity, with an initial focus placed on 
creating the sort of real time information sharing and management system that was noted to be sorely 
lacking during the 2001 attacks. A regional hospital coordinating center (RHCC) was developed, and an 
800 MHz radio system was put in place as the result of a public private partnership entered into with 
northern Virginia’s largest municipality, Fairfax County. Other key efforts included development of a 
regional focus on chemical event preparedness, with coordinated purchasing of a regional cache of 
personal protective equipment (PPE), development of an integrated approach to surge capacity and 
capability that has included an element of telemedicine to assure immediate availability of medical 
expertise and oversight, and a robust pharmaceutical and materials acquisition, storage and logistics 
plan, including the development of a warehouse capacity, to ensure availability of key resources 
separate from state or federal stockpiles. The NVHA remains a robust and vital planning and response 
organization to the present time, led by an Executive Director and governed by an active Board of 
Directors comprised of the CEOs or senior most administrators of each of the region’s 14 hospitals. 
In the aftermath of the 9-11 and anthrax attacks, Arlington County, Virginia, which was one of the last of 
the original 120 MMRS funded “cities”, brought forward the recommendation to expand its MMRS 
program to include some of its northern Virginia neighboring jurisdictions. In 2005, the Northern Virginia 
Emergency Response System (NVERS) was created, representing 25 towns, cities and counties with 
approximately 2 million residents. NVERS supports “a regional approach to coordinated preparedness, 
response, mitigation and recovery across jurisdiction and discipline boundaries during day-to-day 
emergencies and multi-jurisdictional and/or multi-disciplinary incidents through strategic planning, 
priority-setting, information sharing, training, exercises, equipment acquisition and policy-making.” [12] 
It provides for coordination on planning and integration of response capabilities across law 
enforcement, fire and rescue, emergency medical services, hazardous materials, emergency 
management, hospitals, public health, public information and information technology. It coordinates 
closely with its State partners in the Commonwealth of Virginia, as well as with its regional partners in 
the State of Maryland, and the District of Columbia, and partners closely with many of those same 
entities who help to comprise the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. 
Suburban Maryland 
The focus on planning and response to disaster events in the State of Maryland preceded those outlined 
for the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia.  The Maryland Institute for Emergency 
Medical Services System (MIEMSS), founded by the Governor of Maryland in 1973,  placed emphasis on 
the development of a ‘system’ that coordinates the delivery of emergency pre-hospital and hospital 
based care. The central role played by MIEMSS in organizing out-of-hospital and hospital emergency 
capabilities has led to a different approach to the development of regional hospital coalitions. In the 
years prior to the 9-11 attacks, these efforts developed in parallel with the hospital specific planning 
efforts of the DCHA and EMS focused disaster planning occurring in northern VA.   MIEMSS created a 
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seamless statewide radio network linking the state’s hospitals that has been in operation for nearly 
three decades. The state Emergency Medical Resource Center (EMRC) was founded in 1974, 
representing one of the first systems in the nation to emphasize and develop coordination of EMS and 
hospital communications, for use both day-to-day, as well as during disaster events. In the aftermath of 
the region’s experience with the 9-11 attacks, an information management platform focused on facility 
resources data collection and information sharing system was put into place. 
Given the strong State influence on planning, efforts at coalition building has been somewhat limited 
compared with the DC and VA efforts. In 2004, the Bethesda Hospitals’ Emergency Preparedness 
Partnership (BHEPP) was established, creating a planning and response link amongst the local 
community hospital which is an accredited Level 2 trauma center, and the federal medical facilities at 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Naval Medical Center (formerly Bethesda Naval 
Medical Center, now renamed the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center) [13]. In addition, the 
National Library of Medicine, co-located on the NIH campus, is an active member of the partnership. 
This geographically concentrated effort has conducted and participated in numerous exercise events 
focused on coordinating municipal, regional and federal emergency response agencies. By coordinating 
their response capabilities, they have effectively developed a significant capacity to manage a sudden 
influx in patient care needs. They have been an active and engaged partner in planning efforts occurring 
across the National Capital Region.  
More recently, the Suburban Maryland Hospital Coalition has been established, comprised of the 10 
hospitals located in the close in Maryland suburbs of Washington, DC, located in Montgomery and 
Prince George’s Counties (and incorporating the three aforementioned hospitals comprising the BHEPP). 
This entity is a planning group only, focused on the coordination of ASPR/HPP related funding 
opportunities. However, the central Maryland area hospitals signed a regional sharing agreement for the 
first time in 2012, including four hospital signatories from the suburban Maryland region, in order to 
support a disaster event affecting Baltimore hospitals. The voluntary Baltimore Healthcare Facilities Regional 
Mutual Aid System’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreement has formalized the process of 
collaborating in the event that one hospital becomes overwhelmed during a disaster. This agreement allows all 
participating hospitals to work together during an emergency to share staff, beds, equipment, and supplies [14]. 
District of Columbia 
As previously described, the DCHA played a crucial role with regards to coordinating the DC hospitals for 
disaster planning and response. However, five years after the 2001 attacks, the leadership provided by 
DCHA in the emergency preparedness efforts of the DC hospitals transitioned to the DC Emergency 
Healthcare Coalition (DCEHC), which was funded by an ASPR grant in 2007.  Membership includes seven 
acute care hospitals, and a combination of 40 skilled nursing facilities and community health centers.  
DCEHC was developed along the parameters established in the Medical Surge Capacity and Capability 
Healthcare Coalition in Emergency Response and Recovery handbook [15]. It is staffed by a Healthcare 
Coalition Response Team (HCRT), Senior Policy Group, and has created a Coalition Notification Center 
(CNC) which utilizes an on call Duty Officer. The CNC rotates location amongst three DC hospitals 
facilitates information exchange to Coalition members and external partners by use of the HMARS radio 
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system and a health information management platform.  By doing so, the DCEHC has come into sync 
with the NVHA and its Regional Hospital Coordination Center (RHCC) and the State of Maryland’s EMRC, 
in being able to communicate in real time amongst and between the three regional healthcare partners 
of the NCR during day-to-day alerts, and in support of response to disaster events (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. NCR Healthcare Coalition Communications Network 
COALITION OPERATIONAL 
COORDINATION 
CENTER 
COMMUNICATIONS 
CAPABILITIES 
ON-CALL LINKAGES 
DCEHC (regional) Coalition 
Notification 
Center (CNC) 
Hospital Mutual Aid 
Radio System 
(HMARS); Health 
Information System 
Duty Officer Coordinates with DC Dept. 
of Health, DC Fire/EMS, 
Emergency Management 
(EOC) 
NVHA (regional) Regional Hospital 
Coordination 
Center (RHCC) 
MEDCOMM Radio 
Network; Virginia 
Healthcare Alerting 
and Status System 
(VHASS) 
Incident 
Commander and 
Operations Chief 
Coordinates with Virginia 
Dept. of Health 
Communications Centers, 
Local jurisdictional 
emergency management 
(EOCs) 
MIEMSS (state) Emergency 
Medical Resource 
Center (EMRC) 
Radio and 
Microwave 
linkages; HC 
Standard platform 
Field Operations 
Support Team 
Coordinates with EMS, 
Hospitals, 911 centers, 
Maryland Joint Operations 
Center (MJOC) 
Serves as contact point for 
CNC and RHCC 
Note: An HMARS Radio unit and antennae is located and monitored at both Inova Fairfax Hospital 
Medical Campus and the Northern Virginia RHCC, ensuring additional redundancy to the 
communications networks which link the three DC regional healthcare coalitions. 
 
Coordinating across the NCR  
Because so many planned events occur in the Nation’s Capital -- the presidential inauguration every four 
years, and the yearly State of the Union presidential address, and July 4th celebration -- and because 
Washington DC’s buildings and their occupants remain high threat targets for terrorists seeking to inflict 
damage, coordinating communications and response activities across the NCR is of critical importance. 
FEMA’s after action report detailing the planning and response activities related to the 2009 Presidential 
Inauguration of Barack H. Obama highlighted, among other items, the unprecedented degree of 
planning coordination and cooperation that occurred in support of this historic event, particularly in the 
public health and medical sectors. 
Hospital coalitions and individual institutions took a wide range of steps to plan and 
prepare for the Inauguration. The DC Emergency Healthcare Coalition (DCEHC), the DC 
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Hospital Association (DCHA), and the Northern Virginia Hospital Alliance (NVHA) 
developed plans and worked with their members to prepare for the Inauguration. These 
entities developed emergency operation plans, incident action plans and other 
documents to coordinate their members’ response activities. Northern Virginia hospitals 
integrated their planning activities to a degree that exceeded their previous efforts.  
Further, the DCEHC led efforts to create a NCR hospital incident information sharing 
procedure for the Inauguration. [16] 
 
In addition to coordinating the planning efforts, the operational elements required to ensure close 
synchronization of response efforts were also put into place. The DC Department of Health Health 
Emergency Coordination Center (HECC) was utilized during the Inauguration weekend to serve as a 
coordinating point for information relevant to the NCR hospitals and public health agencies, and was 
staffed by members comprising the DC, MD and northern VA hospital coalitions, health departments 
and EMS agencies. The recommendation from the FEMA report was that “NCR hospital and EMS 
partners should identify opportunities to institutionalize these processes in order to prepare the region 
for large-scale, no-notice events”. [17] Similar efforts will have been used in coordinating planning and 
response to this year’s 2013 Presidential Inauguration. 
 
One area in which the FEMA report noted a need for improvement was in developing consistency 
amongst NCR hospitals with regards to sharing a common set of terms and definitions to describe their 
ability to accept patients. The three different jurisdictions each utilized words and phrases that were not 
in use by the other jurisdictions: “Open, Special Diversion, and Closed;” “Green, Yellow, and Red;” and 
“Baseline, Stressed, and Overwhelmed” were all used to describe hospital surge capacity status. As a 
result, “….during the Inauguration, officials unfamiliar with the terminology disseminated an 
announcement predicated on an erroneous understanding of hospital status….This incident illustrates 
how officials unfamiliar with the differing terminology may make erroneous assumptions and 
conclusions about hospital status.” [18] 
 
As a direct result of this experience, the NCR coalition partners have undertaken efforts to standardize 
hospital terminology throughout the region, and have drafted a ‘NCR Hospital Event Information Sharing 
Procedure’. It is intended to provide guidance to the hospital coordination centers located in DC, 
suburban Maryland and northern Virginia in the procedures required to facilitate effective information 
sharing during planned events and major incidents. This draft policy establishes the notification criteria 
that would warrant region wide information sharing (see Box 1). [19] 
 
Box 1. Notification Criteria for National Capitol Region Hospital Information Sharing, from ‘NCR Hospital 
Event Information Sharing Procedure’, Draft document, June 19, 2012  
Judgment by Healthcare Coordinating Center leadership that notification of the other 
NCR Coordinating Centers (VA -- RHCC, MD -- EMRC, DC -- CNC) is warranted. 
A single, mass casualty event that involves 40 or more patients that will require 
transportation to specialty hospitals (pediatrics, trauma) throughout the NCR and/or 
where hospitals outside of the host jurisdiction will receive patients. 
A single HAZMAT event involving 30 or more patients that will/may require 
decontamination. 
An event involving a suspected or confirmed Category A biological agent. 
A Fire/EMS agency has activated a Mass Casualty Unit, Task Force or equivalent, for 
an event occurring in the NCR. 
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Building the Emergency Response System – A Framework for Catastrophic Disaster Response 
The examples of healthcare and hospital coalition development in the NCR over the past two decades 
serve as useful illustrations of how the emergency response system has evolved over time. The progress 
represented by these concrete efforts has been purposefully orchestrated by leaders in the NCR who 
recognize the importance of implementing a ‘systems approach’ to emergency preparedness and 
response. Indeed, these efforts are the substrate necessary for developing the optimal framework 
required for coordinating response between existing healthcare coalitions and the emergency 
management infrastructure. A large scale event, especially a no-notice event such as that posed by an 
IND detonation, will require coordination amongst local, regional and state emergency operations 
centers (EOC). Furthermore, specific to the IND event, the utilization of community reception centers, 
where evacuating patients will be initially assessed or reassessed, re-triaged and if needed, referred for 
more definitive medical assessment and care, will require an entire community’s emergency response 
system to be able to implement. While the health and medical functions will be of paramount 
importance in helping to manage the expected casualties resulting from such an attack, the overarching 
coordination of such events will be managed through respective emergency management agencies, and 
the exchange of critical information is going to occur in EOCs. In addition, the establishment of 
community reception centers, or “assembly centers”, for those patients who are ambulatory and 
evacuating from the site of the detonation or its fallout, will require significant logistical support, 
spearheaded by emergency management authorities. 
Including Health as Part of the Emergency Response System 
As described in the IOM report detailing the development of crisis standards of care, coordination of the 
entire emergency response system is required in order to best mitigate the consequences arising from a 
catastrophic disaster event [20]. This “system” includes those elements traditionally considered to be a 
part of emergency response – police, fire and EMS agencies, but must also include other partners, as 
well. Hospitals, public health agencies, and the private practice medical community are also key 
components. Early planning efforts funded under the Metropolitan Medical Response System grants of 
the late 1990s, followed by the weaknesses exposed by the 9-11 and anthrax attacks of 2001, 
highlighted the importance of bringing health and medical entities to the table as full partners in 
planning and response. Thus, the emergency response system is now intended to be inclusive of public 
health agencies and strives to include those elements involved in the delivery of acute medical care – 
hospitals, clinics, and the private practice community. However, inclusion of the private practice 
healthcare practitioners in the emergency planning and response process remains mostly elusive 
[21,22]. Nonetheless, as exemplified by the NCR coalition development experience, the transition to a 
comprehensive systems approach to preparedness and response is slowly occurring in communities 
across the nation.  
An agency or healthcare facility has accessed and/or requested a CHEMPACK or 
MMRS pharmaceutical cache. 
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Healthcare coalitions may be in the best position to help broker such change. The intent of federal grant 
funding, particularly that coming from the ASPR/Hospital Preparedness Program is focused to ensure 
that such connectivity continues to be developed and planned for.  The enhancement and maturation of 
such connections are vitally important to the success of any response to a catastrophic event. As the 
National Guidance for Healthcare System Preparedness document highlights, “healthcare coalitions, in 
coordination with healthcare organizations, emergency management, ESF (emergency support function) 
# 8, relevant response partners and stakeholders (must) develop a plan to ensure healthcare 
organizations are represented in incident management decisions during an incident.” [23]. 
The healthcare coalition may be uniquely able to plan for disaster response needs irrespective of the 
jurisdictional issues that can often hamper planning within many of the municipal based emergency 
response agencies. Coalition membership is often comprised of healthcare systems that have its 
facilities located in more than one jurisdiction. As a result, these are often organizations that are used to 
routinely coordinating basic public health, EMS and related public safety issues amongst multiple 
jurisdictional agency partners. Given that the healthcare coalitions also chiefly represent private sector 
entities, more latitude in the procurement process can often hasten acquisition of key planning 
resources. Many times such resources may be provided by ‘in-kind’ contributions, of both personnel and 
resources, which further helps to promote the planning effort. For example, the RHCC in Northern 
Virginia is co-located within Inova Health System’s eICU telemedicine nerve center, providing a location 
for a command center that takes advantage of additional functionality provided by the broadband 
connectivity needed for this critical care service.  
Given this potential benefit, the healthcare coalition can help to serve as a convener of emergency 
response entities, much the way the DCHA and the original NVERC, and later the NVHA, did in the 
National Capitol Region. Planning must be based upon known or perceived hazards, and must focus on 
the steps needed to ensure safe, timely and evidenced based responses to the identified risks. Such 
planning must take into account the ability to surge in demand for healthcare services, and must include 
plans that recognize the potential shift in care delivery across the surge spectrum from conventional to 
contingency to crisis surge response [24]. Across the varied risks that might be planned for, the 
healthcare coalition must be prepared to help manage and promote not only communications, 
information sharing and situational awareness, as previously described, but other key issues, as well. 
Key attributes and functions of a robust healthcare coalition are described in Table 2. 
Table 2. Core Functions and Capabilities for Healthcare Coalition Development 
Core Mission Areas Examples 
Regional planning and collaboration Serves as multi-agency coordinating center 
focused on acute care hospitals and healthcare 
organizations 
Communication and information management Interoperable voice and data communications 
systems to share situational awareness; Bed status 
board; Resource tracking board; Mass notification 
and alerting; Patient tracking 
Training, education and exercises Focus areas: incident command; media and crisis 
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communications; active shooter; decontamination 
procedures; burn and trauma care; radiological 
response, others 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) Regional acquisition of biological (N-95 masks, 
elastomeric masks, gowns, gloves) and chemical 
(powered air purifying respirators (PAPR), chemical 
protective clothing, boots) PPE; interchangeable 
across coalition 
Critical infrastructure protection Water system resiliency including emergency 
water pumping and potable water storage 
systems; Electrical power system resiliency 
including installation of emergency generator 
transfer panels (‘quick connect’), ensure adequate 
back-up generator power and fuel to support 
generators 
Decontamination and detection Decontamination showers (fixed facilities 
represent preferred approach, when possible); 
radiation detection portals 
Surge capacity and capabilities Development of “immediate bed availability” 
surge plans, utilizing strategies including 
implementation of reverse triage protocols, 
establishment of “discharge lounges” and 
implementation of telemedicine solutions; 
exploration of regional staffing models 
Pharmaceuticals and materials management Acquisition of key equipment, supplies and 
pharmaceuticals used to support surge response 
efforts including: temporary beds, EMS/transport 
ventilators, portable vacuum suction units, IV 
pumps, “crash” carts, HEPA air ‘scrubbers’; co-
location of CHEMPACK cache 
Security Augmentation of security protocols and 
information sharing among coalition members 
Mass fatality management Procurement of materiel and equipment to 
support mass fatality management, coordinated 
planning to help mitigate placement of decedents 
in setting of large numbers of casualties 
Organization and leadership Leadership, both administrative and clinical (with 
incorporation of subject matter experts to help 
lead policy development); focus on fiduciary goals 
and fiscally prudent and defensible decisions 
 
 
Development of a regional healthcare operations policy, one that details the allocation and sharing of 
key resources, and plans for their utilization across the rainbow of potential scenarios, will be an 
important step taken in the direction of codifying the basic procedures that will govern a response to 
mass casualty, mass exposure and public health emergency. The purpose of such a plan ought to be to 
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describe the systems, tools and organizational structure by which the healthcare coalition will execute 
its basic responsibilities. As noted previously, these include facilitating communications, information 
sharing and response between coalition partners and other relevant response partners at the local, 
regional and state level (i.e., law enforcement, Fire/EMS, Public Health, Emergency Management and 
others); coordinating  the management and distribution of patients from a mass casualty incident to 
receiving hospitals with the public safety and EMS agencies, both municipal and private; promoting 
coordinated and consistent strategies and tactics across the responding coalition members; and 
facilitating resource support to the coalition members, to include mutual aid/cooperative assistance, 
deployment of regional stockpiles (see Table 3), governmental assistance, and the management  of 
spontaneous volunteers or donations. 
Table 3. Example of Healthcare Coalition Resource Stockpiling (from NVHA Regional EOP) 
Personal Protective Equipment:  N95 respirators, procedural masks [adult and pediatric], replacement 
filters for elastomeric respirators, protective gowns 
Temporary Hospital Beds: Portable hospital beds that can be deployed and used to augment surge 
capacity at hospitals or alternate care sites managed by local authorities.  
Linen & Staff Scrubs: disposable linen to include blankets, pillows, hospital sheets, patient gowns [adult 
& pediatric sizes], diapers and staff scrubs. 
Basic Medical Supplies: suture kits, splints, bandages, dressings; divided into 5 identical “caches” that 
are each sub-divided into rolling hospital carts for improved mobility and deployment. 
Ventilators Supplies: ventilator circuits that can be used to support the disaster EMS/transport 
ventilators deployed to coalition member hospitals  
Hydration Fluid & Supplies:  12,000 1 liter bags of normal saline and IV starter kits / catheters [in a 
variety of gauge sizes]. 
Drinking Water: 25,000 individual 1 gallon bottles of drinking water 
Decontamination Supplies:  filters, breathing hoses for PAPRs and spare Level-C DECON suits 
 
 
The role of Regional Healthcare Coalitions in IND Response 
 
As the region begins to take account of what has happened – buildings in downtown DC 
collapsed and on fire, glass from high-rise offices and apartments blown out for miles 
around, roads and highways made impassable by the twisted steel of multiple car crashes, 
large snow-like dust particles beginning to settle back down to the ground – public safety 
radios may begin to crackle, text messages may begin to flow, WTOP may or may not be 
on the air. Most people will have no idea what has occurred, nor what is in store. Many 
thousands are dead; many more thousands are critically injured. Tens of thousands are at 
risk for radioactive exposure, and if they are not directed to shelter immediately, the 
number of casualties from this explosive event will be significantly larger. Patients will 
begin to come to hospitals, clinics and other acute care facilities. The ability to deliver 
stabilizing care will become quickly overwhelmed. Many more will begin to attempt to 
evacuate the city and close in suburbs seeking care elsewhere. The exodus has begun. 
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Building healthcare coalitions into the matrix of emergency response ‘systems’ is critically important, 
particularly in helping to mitigate the health and medical consequences arising from a catastrophic 
event such as that caused by a nuclear detonation. Those coalitions that are in the immediate impact 
zone will have particular challenges as they begin to mount a response to the sudden disaster. In the 
context of an attack in downtown DC, it is likely that the DCEHC may simply cease to function. The NVHA 
and Maryland coalitions are more likely to be able to respond immediately, and their ability to respond 
will also likely trigger the activation of protocols by healthcare coalitions adjacent or otherwise virtually 
connected to them (i.e. the other 5 healthcare coalitions located across the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
and the notification of the entire emergency response system in the State of Maryland). Coalitions will 
need to focus on key functions related to their role as a member of the emergency response system, 
although these implementation priorities may not all be easily accomplished, given the circumstances at 
hand (see Table 4). The key functions that are described will be required of those coalitions both close to 
the impact zone, as well as those located farther away from ground zero. Given the sudden onset, no-
notice circumstances under which such efforts must be mounted, it is likely that the farther away from 
the impact zone, the better organized the health and medical response will be, given mostly to the 
opportunity to implement established protocols and the distance that separates those outlying 
communities from the chaos and confusion wrought by the terrorist attack. 
Table 4. Healthcare Coalition Functions, Roles and Challenges in IND Response (Located at end of paper) 
In their description of the RTR system for spontaneous coordination of an improvised response to an 
IND detonation or other acute radiological emergency, Hrdina, et. al. note the importance of 
establishing not only spontaneously located triage and treatment sites, but based upon their location, 
utilize pre-determined assembly sites based on geographical proximity to render more definitive 
stabilizing care and initiate transport to definitive medical facilities [25]. This conceptual approach to 
developing a spontaneous response to events as disruptive as an IND detonation can only be 
implemented with coordination of all of the emergency response system elements described previously. 
Emergency management agencies will need to help coordinate the ‘reception’ of incoming casualties, 
most of whom are evacuating under their own power, some of whom will require medical attention, 
treatment, diagnosis, and management. Law enforcement presence will be important to coordinate 
people movement and to keep order. EMS transport units will be necessary to help move more severely 
affected patients to definitive care sites. Medical personnel will be required to initiate life stabilizing and 
sustaining care. Public health authorities will be needed to help track patient exposures, get contact 
information for sharing of further public health information, particularly information related to potential 
exposure concerns. Emergency management leadership will likely be needed to help coordinate the co-
location of such services, helping to identify the sites, and the resources required to manage the delivery 
of care under such circumstances. This is particularly important, as one of the key early actions required 
of emergency management will be coordination of messaging regarding the importance of shelter-in-
place strategies that are anticipated to be able to save thousands of lives, and contribute to limiting the 
absolute number of patients who may ultimately require health and medical evaluation and treatment. 
By being linked into this emergency response system, the healthcare coalition will be able to take 
advantage of the information management and communications tools utilized by emergency 
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management. In addition to using these platforms to share actionable information with the affected 
population, direct coordination with the EOC will also be important in helping to procure the additional 
resources needed to respond to the catastrophic event. It is important to emphasize that by 
coordinating such messaging, the EOC, which will already be overwhelmed with information and data 
input, can better prioritize the request for resources that come as “bundled” requests from healthcare 
coalitions, and not as disparate requests for the same types of resource needs repeated by hospital after 
hospital in any given region. Linkages to the EOC, where there will also be public health participation 
and representation, can be used to broadcast early information regarding special medical 
considerations, such as describing the specific needs of suspected or confirmed irradiated patients. Such 
information would be particularly important to share with outlying communities who are likely to see 
the migration of patients away from the epicenter of the event, and towards those communities, and 
could begin to prepare for the arrival of irradiated patients. 
 It would also serve as the opportunity to begin to mobilize other “specialty network coalitions”, 
coalitions of response organizations that can provide specific surge capability, for example those related 
to burn care and radiation injury management. Two regional burn consortia that could provide 
assistance to the NCR include the Eastern Regional Burn Disaster Consortium, based at the Burn Center 
at St. Barnabas Hospital (New Jersey), which includes 27 burn centers along the east coast located from 
Maine to DC/Maryland [26] and the Southern Burn Disaster Program, operationally based in 
Birmingham, Alabama and incorporating burn facilities located from Virginia to Texas [27]. In addition, 
the Radiation Injury Treatment Network [RITN], which provides comprehensive evaluation and 
treatment of radiation injured patients, and has been extensively engaged in IND planning and response 
efforts, would also be activated [28].  
Whereas the close-in healthcare coalitions would likely be overwhelmed with patient care delivery, 
acquisition of needed resources, and protection of existing infrastructure, the ability to relay this 
situational awareness to the State EOC would help to facilitate activation of the aforementioned 
coalitions, and would likely trigger the request for activation of the National Disaster Medical System 
(NDMS), and invoke the participation of the Federal Coordinating Center (FCC) to assist in the receipt, 
triage, staging, tracking and transport of victims of this large scale catastrophic event [29]. 
Assisting Response and Recovery – ‘Network Centric’ Coalitions 
The IND detonation scenario will result in infrastructure damage limited to a circumscribed geographical 
area, and depending on prevailing weather conditions, creation of a dangerous fallout zone that will 
extend for a much larger distance, posing danger to many more citizens who will quickly be at risk for 
radiation exposure.  Given that the characteristics of such an event will change rapidly over time, and in 
light of the importance of public messaging described earlier, a  very important aspect of the response, 
and recovery, will be how effectively critical information will be authenticated, broadcast and updated. 
The progression of healthcare coalition development and cross jurisdictional coordination, as 
exemplified in the progress being made by the DC, suburban Maryland and northern Virginia healthcare 
coalitions, demonstrates the importance of pursuing the concept of “networks of networks” in achieving 
the capabilities required for robust and resilient community response to catastrophic disaster. 
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Network centric, or “netcentric” refers to the development of a “continuously-evolving, complex 
community of people, devices, information and services interconnected by a communications network 
to optimize resource management and provide superior information on events and conditions needed 
to empower decision makers.” [30] A concept of network centric warfare was introduced to the 
Department of Defense in the mid to late 1990s [31] There are four distinct components of this 
approach: (1) A robustly networked force improves information sharing; (2) information sharing and 
collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness; (3) shared 
situational awareness enables self-synchronization; and, (4) the above dramatically increase mission 
effectiveness. The de-emphasizing of traditional hierarchical command and control approaches to 
incident management, and the recognition that spontaneous decision making will be effective in the 
setting of horizontal information flow, matches well with the potential role that healthcare coalitions 
could and should play in response to an IND event.  
Healthcare coalitions that organize to form regional networks can improve communications of resource 
needs and provide situational awareness. The goal of such networks will be to enhance the response 
regarding management of the unstructured intake of arriving patients as well as providing for the 
intensive medical support irradiated patients will need under such circumstances. In the first hour to 
hours, during which time event characterization will be important, effort will be focused on projecting 
the location and direction of the fallout plume, and sharing this information with the public. Hours after 
the detonation, to the first day or days, information provided to those who require radiation screening, 
or more definitive medical attention, will become most important. While this information will be of 
significant important in the close in communities affected by the blast, because of the forecast 
population movement anticipated as occurring as a result of such an attack, the surrounding 
communities will play an increasingly important role in supporting the needs of this migrating 
population. 
Those close-in communities that are geographically adjacent to the ground zero impact zone will 
struggle to accomplish the emergency response functions related to security, fire suppression, search 
and rescue, patient care delivery and other fundamental response efforts. Those communities that are 
farther away from ground zero, the unaffected ‘collar communities’, will have an enormous 
responsibility to support command and control functions, both hierarchical and vertical, and to support 
the lost infrastructure in the affected communities. This may include not only the communications 
infrastructure, but much of the emergency response mechanism that may either be directly impacted by 
the event, or consumed by the enormous response that is likely to be required. Collar community 
healthcare coalitions may be able to broaden their network of communications capabilities, 
coordinating communication and allocation requests that accommodate the needs of the impact 
communities. Perhaps most importantly, collar community coalitions will be required to ramp up 
procedures for managing the influx of surge patients (trauma, radiation, combined, non-affected but 
requiring ‘routine’ emergency care, etc) that are certain to present seeking medical care and attention. 
As patients care needs become better defined, and the stratification of care is conducted along the 
surge capacity framework ranging from conventional surge to contingency and crisis surge responses, 
the outlying healthcare coalitions will be able to prioritize information shared with the State EOC and 
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Federal government regarding resource allocation needs. This coalition to coalition networking and 
coordinated response, as well as coalition to state coordination, is only possible with the development 
of robust, mature healthcare coalitions that are fully integrated partners in their community emergency 
response system. 
Conclusion 
A catastrophic emergency, of which an IND detonation may be the prototypical example, demonstrates 
the importance of developing robust emergency response systems that have the capacity and capability 
to manage a complex set of response requirements. In this type of event, the impact area affected by 
the detonation will be surrounded by an intact infrastructure. The role of the healthcare coalitions will 
be particularly important in helping to coordinate information flow supporting real-time situational 
awareness, and interpreting data pertaining to resource utilization and initiating the request for 
resource needs. Acquiring and sharing such data will need to occur with the support of affiliated 
emergency management agencies. Such efforts will be critically important to the public health and 
healthcare response faced by communities that are geographically situated immediately outside of the 
blast zone following an IND attack.  
Lessons learned from the decade long maturation of healthcare coalition development in and around 
the National Capital Region – in the District of Columbia, northern Virginia and the close in suburbs of 
Maryland – highlights the attributes of such coalitions, and establishes some of the benchmarks that 
may be useful to other communities seeking to develop the same level of capability and coordination.  
In the event of catastrophic attack or natural disaster that disrupts civil society, the priority to return to 
normalcy, or at least a “new normalcy” will be of utmost importance. And the attempt to minimize the 
adverse healthcare consequences related to such an event will make the difference between whether or 
not a response is viewed as successful. Strong, robust, and well managed healthcare coalitions will play 
an important role in enhancing the response to any catastrophic event, and may be uniquely positioned 
to be able to coordinate key response actions that cross jurisdictional lines. By doing so, they will be 
immensely useful in assisting to relieve the burden on those areas most severely impacted. 
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Table 4. Healthcare Coalition Functions, Roles and Challenges in IND Response 
Core Coalition 
Functions 
Implementation Priorities in 
IND response 
Potential Challenges  
Regional planning 
and collaboration 
Establish situational awareness 
amongst coalition members, 
and across regional boundaries 
to include neighboring 
coalitions; coordinate strategic 
and tactical health/medical 
response plans 
Early priorities will include participation of 
emergency response system partners in assisting 
coalition members --  assistance from public safety 
agencies to manage surge response and security 
needs; assistance from Public Health authorities to 
establish patient registry and contact tracing 
mechanism; emergency management for 
assistance in resource procurement via 
coordination with local/regional/State EOCs; 
local/regional/State government leadership in 
establishing key crisis messaging regarding life 
saving and sustaining actions 
Communication 
and information 
management 
Report bed, staff and resource 
availabilities; coordinate with 
local, regional and State EOCs 
Communications networks for both voice and data 
may be significantly impaired 
Personal 
protective 
equipment (PPE) 
Establish uniform protocols for 
staff protection from 
radiological hazards; coordinate 
with other members of 
emergency response system 
(public safety agencies) 
Relatively limited supplies of PPE may be rapidly 
exhausted; tactical decisions regarding greatest 
need for PPE may occur amongst emergency 
response system partners, possibly resulting in re-
assignment of available resources  
Critical 
infrastructure 
protection 
Ensure safety of drinking water 
sources; implement back-up 
power support; assess structural 
integrity of healthcare facilities 
located closest to impact area 
Water pressures likely to be low; widespread 
power outages expected, requiring sustained 
operations with limited water and requirement for 
back-up power generation; re-supply of water and 
fuel not likely; lack of fuel will significantly hamper 
responder relief efforts, including the need to 
transport patients to outlying facilities 
Decontamination 
and detection 
Decontaminate incoming 
patients per established 
protocols; implement radiation 
detector capabilities at 
healthcare institutions (portal or 
hand-held); ensure that staff are 
appropriately decontaminated, 
and prioritize public safety staff 
decontamination, if needed 
Water may not be available for decontamination; 
healthcare facilities have limited capability to 
provide dry decontamination; few healthcare 
facilities have portal radiation detectors, hand 
held survey monitoring will be time consuming 
Surge capacity and 
capabilities 
Implement surge response 
strategies accounting for ‘crisis 
standards of care’ response – 
transition to contingency and 
crisis surge response protocols 
Healthcare facilities will face unprecedented 
demands for service care delivery, yet must also 
maintain services to existing patients, and those 
who present with other emergencies unrelated to 
the immediate effects of the detonation event 
Pharmaceuticals 
and materials 
Access and distribute available 
local/regional equipment, 
Transportation infrastructure may impede physical 
movement of materiel from central warehouse to 
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management supplies and pharmaceuticals; 
initiate requests for additional 
materiel based on actual and 
projected patient care needs 
healthcare facilities; ability to develop ‘demand 
forecasting’ based on projected needs limited 
Security Need to establish security of 
healthcare facilities; need to 
promote passage of hospital 
staff, both direct healthcare 
providers and non-healthcare 
support service employees, 
across police lines to be able to 
report to work 
Limited personnel will not be able to be 
augmented by law enforcement agencies, which 
will be otherwise engaged in the response; staff 
without proper credentialing may have difficulty 
crossing police lines;  spontaneous volunteers will 
require management and coordination, including 
credentialing (numbers of volunteers may be 
limited due to concern regarding potential 
exposure to radiation) 
Mass fatality 
management 
Prepare for mass fatalities that 
result from IND attack 
May be overwhelming demand for external 
service support; healthcare facilities will have to 
be prepared to store and catalogue decedents 
from an event, including those that may have 
radiological contamination, on site 
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